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1  INTRODUCTION 
Global poverty largely remains a rural phenomenon. Close to 70 per cent of the developing 
world’s 1.4 billion people living in extreme poverty inhabit rural areas (IFAD, 2011).  
Further, agriculture is found to be a source of livelihood for over 80 per cent of rural people, 
highlighting the importance of supporting this activity as a means to fight poverty (World 
Bank, 2007; IFAD, 2011). This is darkly ironic: rural areas are where most of the world’s food is 
produced and also where the majority of the world’s extreme poor and malnourished reside.  
Poverty in rural areas stems from a diverse set of shortcomings such as: lack of adequate public 
investments in infrastructure, storage and market facilities coupled with disadvantages rooted 
in historical inequities, agricultural, land tenure and credit policies and economic factors that 
have a bearing on the distribution of assets, productive resources and access to credit and 
markets. Rural livelihoods are also based on a wide range of activities ranging from agricultural 
production to off-farm wage labour, and these vary across agro-climatic zones, land tenure 
arrangements, regions and cultures. The growing frequency of extreme weather events and 
recent increases in global financial and commodity price volatility—with sharp price rises 
particularly since 2006 (FAO et. al., 2011: 8)—have heightened the obstacles that rural 
producers, particularly poor, already face in many regions and have also contributed  
to severe localised food insecurity.  
Following the food crisis, the Secretary General of the United Nations established a  
High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis in 2008. The Task Force developed a 
Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) which outlined a twin-track response to the global 
hunger crisis. As a first response, access and affordability to food needs to be adequately 
addressed if the world is to tackle the immediate hunger epidemic it is facing. Second, the 
framework highlights the importance of revitalising agricultural production—specifically, 
smallholder production—with the capacity to support an alternative solution drawing on  
local and more sustainable practices to come to grips with new realities of population growth, 
climate change and deteriorating rural livelihoods. Protection against shocks is also essential 
to minimise households’ vulnerability which is subject to little or no investment in production, 
an inability to cover basic needs and, ultimately, a persistence of poverty.  
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The food regime prevalent in many countries, however, prioritises global integration  
and competitive export markets over domestic and local production. For many smallholders, 
assured access to the export market is challenging and, as seen recently, tends to be financially 
volatile. Challenges arise due to a focus on national economies of scale in production and 
marketing combined with stringent quality and safety standards on the part of importing 
countries and supermarket chains. This is exacerbated by relatively limited equal access to 
public investment and financial assistance. As a result, with uncertain access to capital and 
larger markets, smallholders are less economically competitive against large-scale agribusiness 
in producing for specialised markets of scale (Schnieder et al., 2010).  
Where linkages between local production and consumption can be articulated, local 
production can be economically viable and socially and environmentally sustainable. Due to 
the diverse challenges and magnitude of obstacles facing rural livelihoods around the world, 
local initiatives can be responsive to local conditions and opportunities. Approaches that 
support smallholder rural livelihoods as a modality to combat hunger are of particular  
value (IFAD, 2012). Local initiatives can not only address hunger but also effectively and 
appropriately address regional, communal and culturally specific diets (Allen, 2010). On the 
production side, disparities in climate, soil and farming techniques can be minimised through 
local support and innovative solutions tailored to specific geographical needs (IAASTD, 2009).  
In fact, a number of countries are looking to put in place innovative policies to address  
the new risks and vulnerabilities that are surfacing in the global food regime and to enable  
a response to often long-standing local and national challenges in ensuring adequate 
production and food security. It is in this context that this paper seeks to explore the 
experience of Brazil’s Food Acquisition Programme (Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos – PAA). 
The main goal of the PAA is to “guarantee access to food in the proper quantity, quality and 
regularity according to the needs of populations living in food and nutritional insecurity, as 
well as to promote social inclusion in rural areas by strengthening family agriculture”  
(MDS, 2010, cited in Chmielewska and Souza, 2010).  
The paper begins in Section 2 by providing an overview of the design, operations  
and trajectories of the PAA. We explore the actors involved in the design and the different 
implementation modalities (i.e. purchase from individual farmers and associations and 
organisation of purchase by the national supply company, local municipalities and states).  
The actual steps that need to be followed in the procurement process are also outlined with a 
view to highlighting some of the key issues that will have a bearing on scaling up the programme 
in terms of the scale of its scope and reach to some of the more vulnerable family farmers.  
Section 3 outlines the objectives of this study which are to (i) to provide first-hand 
documentation of the design and operations of the programme—which includes the observed 
physical actors—involved in design and implementation; and (ii) to identify the potential  
for scaling up the programme in country and the possibilities for South–South knowledge-
building. Desk research is informed by field research in the states of Piauí and Ceará, both  
of which are in the north-eastern region of Brazil. This region has the highest incidence of 
extreme poverty in the country, a major share of which is located in rural areas. Consequently, 
the federal government sees the expansion of the PAA as a crucial instrument to achieve its 
goal of eliminating extreme poverty, especially in the north-eastern region. Piauí is one of the 
states that has most deployed the PAA-Estadual modality. Ceará was chosen to observe  
the PAA-Municipal modality which is not present in Piauí.  
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Section 4 then looks at issues of recent policy developments and scaling up, particularly  
at the level of expanding coverage for the extreme poor. Expansion of the programme  
can be analysed in terms of different pathways (Linn/IFPRI, 2012). Geographical expansion  
or expanding coverage to a particular population under the programme could follow a 
‘horizontal’ duplication in new areas. The addition or modification of modalities could 
represent a ‘functional’ expansion through new methods to increase participation.  
Institutional expansion across local, state or national levels indicates a ‘vertical’ expansion.  
The paper argues that, due to the multi-stakeholder design of the programme, it is expanding 
through all three of the above pathways under the federal government’s new strategy to 
eliminate extreme poverty. The paper also looks at the specific issues of how to reach hitherto  
unreached populations and how to cover current programme participants more effectively.  
The following sections go on to explore key issues and challenges with regard to scaling 
up such as organisational capacities of farmers, transportation, design of payment systems and 
financing. The approach taken by Brazil’s PAA, including recent developments, is considered, 
and the issues that are likely to be of most interest from the point of view of South–South 
knowledge-sharing are highlighted. 
2  BRAZIL’S FOOD ACQUISITION PROGRAMME:  
DESIGN AND OPERATIONS 
In Brazil, 84.4 per cent of all farm production units are family farms,1 yet they occupy just 24.3 
per cent of the total area of rural establishments. There are also significant variations in the 
profile of family farmers across the different agro-climatic zones and regions of Brazil. Over 25 
per cent of Brazil’s rural population lives in extreme poverty. Moreover, roughly 50 per cent of 
the country’s total family farmers reside in Brazil’s northeast, with 35 per cent living in extreme 
poverty (IBGE, 2010). Significant numbers of family farmers in the arid north-east, in particular, 
cultivate relatively small plots of land and supplement their incomes with social transfers. 
Poverty levels are also relatively higher for Brazil’s indigenous peoples (39.9 per cent) and Afro-
Brazilians (Federal Government of Brazil, 2011; IFAD, 2011; Gradin, 2007; Hall and Patrinos, 2006).  
Across the developing world small farmers are often faced with severe inequalities of land 
and income coupled with more limited access to public infrastructure and resources. With 
access to adequate productive resources, however, they could very well be the greatest 
untapped productive force if we are to attack hunger and poverty and promote a more 
economically, socially and environmentally sustainable form of agricultural production. 
Despite the land inequality, family farmers already produce 70 per cent of all food products 
consumed by Brazilians daily (IBGE, 2009). 
Support to family farming is a major policy issue in Brazil. The government of Luis Inácio 
‘Lula’ da Silva particularly emphasised this theme and reorganised a number of existing 
programmes and expanded the state’s commitment to poverty alleviation and food security. 
Lula claimed he would have accomplished his life mission if, by the end of his terms in office, 
every Brazilian were able to have three meals a day (Graziano da Silva, 2009). To fulfil this 
mission, the Lula government initiated a bold framework to eliminate hunger aptly named 
Zero Hunger (Fome Zero).  
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Although many programmes and ministries are involved in implementing this 
comprehensive attack on hunger, one programme has been particularly innovative  
in simultaneously supporting rural livelihoods and reducing hunger through the same 
programme modality. Launched in 2003, Brazil’s PAA is a government-sponsored food 
procurement programme that utilises the productive capacity of family farms to contribute  
to meeting the nutritional needs of people living in food insecurity, by supplying food to local 
public school feeding programmes, food banks, community kitchens, charitable associations 
and community centres for the needy (CAISAN, 2011). The programme has a dual function of 
providing market access to eligible family farmers—by purchasing crops at fair prices based on 
the regional market average—and contributing to food security through (mainly) donations to 
vulnerable groups.  
2.1  ELIGIBILITY FOR THE PAA 
Currently, family farm status is determined by eligibility for public programmes aimed at  
family farmers, principally the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming 
(PRONAF). All farmers wishing to participate in the PAA must first have a declaration of 
aptitude or fitness for PRONAF, the Declaração de Aptidão ao Pronaf (DAP). In 2006, the federal 
government passed Law no. 11,326, also known as the Family Farming Law, which provides  
a formal definition of a family farm as follows:  
1. An establishment or area of economic activity in a rural area of less than  
four fiscal modules;2 
2. A majority of the labour used on the farm is sourced from the family members; 
3. A majority of the income comes from the property: agriculture, fishing or 
gathering etc.; 
4. The establishment is managed by the family. 
 
The DAP is the government’s registration and targeting mechanism for all family 
producers in the country. Without it, a family farmer is off the radar and will not be able to 
access government policies and credit. Information submitted through DAP applications 
allows the government to compile data on income, labour, land and management for all 
registered family farmers. The DAP registry allows for registration of families represented by  
a signatory head of household (classified into different groups) and associations of farmers. 
Group ‘A’ is the most vulnerable group and includes the most recent land reform settlers3 and 
those with little to no income. Group ‘B’ includes more established land reform settlers and 
poor family farmers, fisher folk and artisanal rural households.4 The groups were developed to 
correspond to available lines of credit through the country’s extensive family farmer credit line 
(PRONAF), but the registration also provides a convenient way to set priorities for the PAA to 
procure from the most vulnerable producers (Ministério da Integração Nacional). Although the 
most vulnerable family farmers are intended to be first in line for selling to the PAA, there is no 
evidence that this clause is always put into practice at the local level.  
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2.2  PAA MODALITIES AND FINANCING  
Funds for the programme are directed from the federal Ministry of Agrarian Development 
(Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrário – MDA) and the Ministry of Social Development and 
Fight Against Hunger (Minisério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome – MDS), while 
implementation is a coordinated effort between the National Supply Company (Conab) and 
local governments (state and municipal). Although several modalities are used to procure  
and distribute food from family farms, the most widely used method is ‘purchase with 
simultaneous donation’ (compra para doação simultânea – CDS), which comprises over 80 per 
cent of all purchases (Conab, 2012). This modality uses two different interventions for farmers, 
both with an annual cap of R$4500 (US$2217) per family (Chmieleweska and Souza, 2010).  
FIGURE 1 
PAA Financial Allocation by Modality, 2010 (%) 
 
Source: MDS, 2012. 
 
Moreover, this modality also represents 63.6 per cent of total PAA funds; with PAA-Leite 
(an incentive for the production and consumption of milk) representing 34.2 per cent, together 
they total 97.8 per cent of total programme resource allocation from January to June 2012 
(MDS, 2012).  
While PAA-Leite is limited to the procurement and distribution of milk products and covers 
just 10 states, CDS covers all 26 states and procures vegetables, fruits, meat, eggs, milk and 
derivatives, grains, cereals, baked goods, honey, fish, sweets, spices, sugar, oilseed and more. 
In light of trends in the allocation of PAA resources as well as the objectives and functions 
of each of the PAA modalities, we focus on the CDS modality. CDS is the most significant not 
only in terms of resources but also with regard to geographical coverage and the diversity of 
food items procured. This modality can be implemented by three different institutional  
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executors. Under the first type of CDS intervention (PAA-Conab) Conab is the executor and 
organises purchases from farmer associations, cooperatives or unions for distribution to 
centres fulfilling a public good. The first step of the process involves the association or 
cooperative holding an informal meeting to assess the productive capacity of the farmers  
by way of type and quantity of products. After determining the viability of their project, the 
association collects all of the necessary information from the producers (DAP registration 
numbers, specific crop and weight to be procured etc.) and identifies institutions to receive the 
food donations (prisons, social assistance centres, hospitals, schools etc.). When the association 
has compiled all of the necessary information, it submits its project proposal via Conab’s online 
registration portal, PAAnet.5 Conab is then responsible for reviewing the project and either 
approving or rejecting it, depending on whether the information is adequate and meets the 
requirements (for example, all the producers have DAPs, and the receiving institutions are 
eligible etc.). The approval process from Conab often includes a visit from a representative who 
travels to the location to approve the project for six to 12 months; it can then be renewed 
every six to 12 months without requiring an official visit from Conab.  
TABLE 1 
Brazil’s Food Acquisition Programme  
Modality 
Objectives  
and Functions 
Source of 
Funding 
Executor 
Forms  
of Access 
Limit  
per Family 
(R$/year) 
Direct Purchase 
(CD) 
Purchase poles;  In situations 
of low price or by virtue 
of meeting demands for food‐
insecure populations; Playing 
an important role in the 
regulation of prices and supply. 
MDS and 
MDA 
CONAB 
Individuals, 
informal groups, 
cooperatives, 
associations 
8000 
(US$3938) 
Stock Formation 
(FE) 
Provides tools to farmers to 
support the commercialisation 
of its products, price support 
and add value 
to production; procures food 
for inventory stocks to be 
marketed or distributed to 
food‐insecure groups  
MDS and 
MDA 
CONAB 
Cooperatives and 
associations 
8000 
(US$3938) 
Direct Purchase 
with Simultaneous 
Donations 
(CDS) 
Procure food grown by family 
farmers and provide donations 
of food to entities in the socio‐
assistance network   
MDS 
CONAB, 
states, 
municipalities 
Individuals, 
informal groups, 
cooperatives, 
associations 
4500 
(US$2217) 
Incentive for 
Production and 
Consumption of 
Milk 
(PAA‐Leite) 
Encourage the consumption 
of milk to families who are in a 
state of food insecurity and 
nutrition, and encourage 
family farmer production 
MDS 
Northeast 
states and 
Minas Gerais 
Individuals, 
informal groups, 
cooperatives, 
associations 
8000 
(US$3938) 
Source: Gestor do PAA (2010). 
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After the project is approved through Conab, all the participating farmers, the cooperative 
or the association must open a bank account through an accredited bank to receive payments. 
Cooperatives’ management and members are responsible for receiving their payments.  
The association or cooperative is then responsible for monitoring (and possibly collecting  
and distributing) the delivery of the products. The association or cooperative uses the PAAnet 
database to input the successful delivery of each farmer’s committed quota, whereupon Conab 
authorises the payment to be released into each farmer’s bank account within 15 days.  
FIGURE 2 
CDS PAA-Conab Process 
 
 
The second and third purchase interventions within CDS, PAA-Estadual and PAA-Municpal, 
are organised by state and municipal governments, respectively, that contract direct purchases 
from individual family farms, cooperatives or associations for distribution to local public 
facilities (schools, day-care centres, community kitchens etc.) and social assistance 
programmes. This process is similar to PAA-Conab but is instead organised by the  
local Secretary of Agriculture or Rural Development and bypasses the state Conab office.  
This process also typically involves cross-cutting Municipal Secretaries to coordinate the 
distribution end of the programme. One example would be that the Secretary of Social 
Assistance will identify beneficiaries and institutions to receive the food and coordinate 
transportation of the food. The Secretary of Agriculture would then only be responsible for 
coordinating the submission of the project and targeting farmers to produce for the programme. 
Municipal coordination entities maintain close ties with both the producers and the 
beneficiaries, to be aware of the supply and demand for family farm products (Romeiro, 2010). 
The prices available to farmers through the PAA CDS are determined by a regional survey 
undertaken by Conab every six months that takes a sample of three municipalities. 
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FIGURE 3 
Decentralised Systems of Food and Nutritional Security 
 
Source: Graph translated from Romeiro d'Avila by authors. 
3  SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE CASE STUDIES  
3.1  THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS 
The field research was conducted in the states of Piauí and Ceará, both of which are  
in the north-eastern region of Brazil. This region has the highest incidence of extreme  
poverty in the country, the majority of which is located in rural areas. Consequently, the 
government sees the expansion of the PAA as a crucial instrument to achieve its goal of 
eliminating extreme poverty, especially in the north-eastern region. Piauí has the highest level 
of income inequality in the country and is also one of the states that is most heavily engaged in 
the PAA-Estadual modality. Ceará was chosen to observe the PAA-Municipal modality which is 
not present in Piauí.  
Family farm households were selected as the unit of analysis for semi-structured 
interviews which took place in a variety of environments. Most households interviewed were 
located on agrarian reform settlements and reflected a variety of age, both in terms of the 
settlements themselves and in that of the heads of households. The organisational level also 
varied. We were able to interview members of rural workers’ unions, cooperatives, associations 
and non-affiliated producers. Our interviewees also included producers participating in various 
functions of the PAA modalities or not participating in the programme at all.  
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FIGURE 4 
Research Location (Piauí: red;  Ceará: blue) 
 
 
In Piauí, stakeholder interviews were undertaken in four different municipalities:  
União, Alto Longá, São João do Arraial and Esperantina. Within the different municipalities 
 we identified several key local institutions responsible for supporting and organising the  
PAA process: the municipal government (Prefeitura), nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), 
associations and rural workers’ unions. All of the municipalities we visited in Piauí had support 
and participation from the Conab state office. Given this important role played by Conab in 
Piaui, we also visited the regional office in the state’s capital, Teresina, to talk with the 
Superintendent and Operations Manager.  
The Conab staff offered many useful insights into the workings of the PAA and 
highlighted common issues that had arisen from their experience as executor. First, the  
timing of receiving and distributing funds is extremely important. If the federal funding  
that is channelled to Conab is behind schedule, it delays payments. This not only hurts family 
farmers who may be very dependent on income from the PAA, but it also deflates morale and 
creates uncertainties regarding the programme’s reliability as a source of markets and income. 
Although a guaranteed fair-priced market opportunity is great for the planning and 
production process of family farmers, a delay in payments could render the procurement 
process incompatible with their needs for predictable and timely cash inflows. 
In most cases, however, Conab acknowledged that the PAA works effectively in a timely 
manner—helping people organise and plan production with baseline prices, guaranteed 
market access and incentives to increase production and quality. However, formal contractual 
relationships, including with the government, are very new for some family farmers.  
The process could thus be a bit slow for farmers who are uncertain about the value added  
by building relationships and having formal agreements. Once established, however, the PAA 
dismantles the traditional supply chain and prepares family farmers to not only develop their 
organisation and productive capacities but also to understand markets and the pricing 
structures for future market opportunities. 
There were variations in the level of engagement of stakeholders in the different 
municipalities, reflecting local political economies. Even as the potential for different actors  
to play facilitation roles in helping farmers to organise their institutional capacities was in 
evidence, the importance of coordination across state actors, civil society and institutions  
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of family farmers was clear. For example, União has a municipal government committed to 
implementing and expanding the PAA but little involvement of NGOs and associations, while 
Alto Longá has more widespread support and advocacy from the local rural unions than from 
the municipal government. Our experience in São João de Arrairal indicated a coordinated 
effort between all institutions to not only expand the PAA but also to implement an array of 
complementary programmes. Lastly, Esperantina has committed associations, but they are 
currently not integrating their efforts with the municipal government. Consequently, the  
PAA’s impact was most clearly observed in São João de Arrairal, where the PAA was only one 
component of a local coordinated effort to support local production for local needs.  
In Ceará we visited the municipality of Itapipoca, which only participates in one modality 
of the PAA—PAA-Municipal—and receives no support from Conab. Itapipoca also covers  
an area that includes three distinct agricultural regions: semi-arid (sertão), mountainous  
(zona serrana) and tropical-coastal (litoral). The rich ecological diversity coupled with a strong 
NGO presence presented Itapipoca as a unique case for amplifying the PAA beyond the current 
one modality. However, the missing presence of Conab seemed to be a significant barrier to 
fortifying and expanding participation in the PAA.  
All of the municipalities we observed had substantial experience with implementing the 
PAA and were privy to government changes in policy and strategy for supporting family farms 
and combating food insecurity. Our interviews reflected current policy environments that 
signify limited changes in policy through a scaling-up process. Despite new nomenclature, 
policies that support family farmers and non-contributory social protection policies have  
gone largely unchanged over the last 10 years.  
3.2  STRENGTHENING LOCAL CAPACITIES, COMMUNITIES AND ECONOMIES 
Brazil’s PAA has numerous transformative effects on the local economy and society. Its design 
in connecting local production with consumption has the ability to restructure the economy 
by boosting the incomes of family rural producers, which, in turn, links their productive 
capacity to local demand. For many small farmers, the lack of consistent access to a market  
is a significant obstacle to guaranteed income and investment for production. By assuring  
a consistent and predictable market, the PAA revitalises smallholder production which is 
significantly more efficient than large-scale industrial farms in providing for diverse nutritional 
needs on a domestic and local level (Rosett, 2000). With their market facilitated through the 
PAA, producers are also able to witness the consumption and get a first-hand account of the 
market for their produce, while consumers are also closer to the production of their food. 
This type of public procurement programme, therefore, has the ability to provide a level 
of social protection to both small family farmers and vulnerable populations living in extreme 
poverty. The PAA provides livelihood protection for recent land beneficiaries and other 
previously excluded family farmers with secured access to fair-priced markets. For food-
insecure groups, the PAA targets vulnerable groups in the community for food donations.  
The organiser of each PAA CDS ‘project’ locates a food beneficiary and registers it through the 
PAA system, either through PAAnet or the municipality. In many cases, public institutions were 
previously purchasing through a wholesaler but are now able to receive food through the PAA 
at no cost to them and only the procurement cost through the programme itself. Both local 
producers and local consumers, therefore, receive protection regarding their livelihoods and 
basic needs, respectively. By combining local procurement with local donations, these 
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programmes promote the possibility of breaking the conventional supply chain of the food 
system’s private intermediaries. They can then protect producers from market exclusion and 
unfair prices, while protecting vulnerable consumers who may not be able to afford otherwise 
high food costs. Further, we found the PAA as an incentive for producers to engage with or join 
farmer associations, organisations and/or groups, leading to a more integrated, participatory 
and socially inclusive community through social capital. 
Additionally, by providing prices based on a regional market average, family farmers 
participating in the PAA said that they receive anywhere from 30 per cent to 300 per cent  
more from the procurement programmes than a private intermediary or selling directly to 
 the market. This, of course, depends on the crop and market conditions, but, nonetheless,  
the vast majority of family farmers we encountered received a price increase in that range.  
This guaranteed market access, coupled with favourable pricing conditions, undoubtedly 
enables and incentivises farmers to increase production. Further, as long as family farmers  
are registered with DAP, the procurement programme is open to all family farmers—providing 
inclusive market access for all with a maximum procurement between R$375 (US$184) and 
R$666 (US$327) per family farm per month.  
Local social networks are enabled by establishing linkages between local smallholder 
production and local consumption. For example, we witnessed that farmers participating in 
the PAA are more concerned about the quality and safety of their products due to their close 
relationship with the consumers. In many cases, procured food is distributed to the local 
schools with students who are the children of the famers supplying the free lunch programme. 
In an optimal setting Belik and Domene (2012) observed a municipality in the state of  
São Paulo that integrated the school feeding programme and the PAA where schools were 
able to incorporate their menus to seasonal variations in PAA delivery. Although they 
determined that the strategy required a high level of organisation and local cooperation, 
numerous benefits were observed, including: more organised production, expansion of  
farmer cooperatives, increased civic participation and public management, and more diverse 
and healthier foods in the schools (Belik and Domene, 2012). Thus, many farmers are not only 
concerned about receiving their payments for the produce but also are more likely to have a 
vested interest in maintaining nutritious, less chemical-dependent agricultural methods  
and feel empowered to contribute to the community (Belik and Domene, 2012: 63.).  
The PAA can also serve as a facilitator for increased cooperation and organisation 
between farmers. Each modality brings producers together in some function, with either 
Conab working with and strengthening cooperatives and associations or the municipality 
identifying family farmers to participate and combining their production to serve local  
food security concerns. We identified numerous benefits as a result of this strengthened 
cooperation. First, building relationships between local facilitators (Conab, local Secretary of 
Agriculture) engages farmers with policy and governmental assistance, which often extends 
beyond the PAA. Farmers were more likely to access the government’s credit line for family 
farmers (PRONAF) and search out technical assistance (which can often be the municipal 
Secretary of Agricultural Development). Another notable benefit is the increased knowledge-
sharing between farmers participating in the PAA. The programme channels local demand  
into organising production and provides income to previously unused resources.  
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4  SCALING UP AND RECENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
The election of President Dilma Rousseff in 2010 signified a continuation and strengthening  
of the social protection and productive inclusion policies already in place. With the objective of 
eliminating extreme poverty by 2014, however, some of the existing policies and programmes 
were reconfigured to more effectively reach extremely poor people. A new umbrella 
programme, Brazil without Misery (Brasil sem Miséria – BSM), was launched in 2011.  
The plan calls for a national and regional focus to lift over 16 million Brazilians out of extreme 
poverty, based on three sets of actions: income, productive inclusion6 and public services. 
Brazil’s flagship Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme, the Bolsa Familia, is to be 
expanded to another 800,000 families. Additionally, the BSM plan outlines very ambitious 
goals to tremendously amplify the PAA (MDS, 2011). Since its inception in 2003, the budget  
for public food purchases in the programme has expanded from just over R$80 million  
(US$39 million) to over R$790 million (US$388 million) and encompasses over 200,000 family 
farms in the country (Conab, 2012). By 2014, BSM plans to more than double the number  
of family farmers selling produce to the PAA to almost 450,000 families (MDA, 2012). 
New poverty statistics indicate that 8.5 per cent of the total Brazilian population is living in 
extreme poverty (under R$70 a month) and that the number increases to 25.5 per cent in rural 
areas (IBGE, 2010). Since rural areas have a higher incidence of poverty, the PAA must play a 
critical role in expanding productive inclusion for historically marginalised populations.  
The Brazilian government has identified around 255,000 farming families as living in  
extreme poverty based on their income levels as reported through DAP registrations  
(Federal Government of Brazil, 2012). The government’s strategy is to provide a targeted  
effort to significantly raise the productive incomes of those families (Müller, 2012).  
This is being sought not only by trying to provide them with access to PAA and other 
policies but also by making them eligible to receive R$2400 (US$1181) as a one-time grant 
(fomento) which is paid out in instalments for productive investment. This grant becomes 
available once a field technician has signed off on the family, indicating that they are prepared 
and knowledgeable on how to use their grant for productive investment. Therefore, to be 
eligible for the fomento, the family must have access to technical assistance which we found to 
be very scarce. In addition, to reach the most excluded of the excluded, BSM needs to identify 
several obstacles they face. Primarily, the federal government is severely limited in targeting by 
using DAP as its instrument. Many farmers (typically the most marginalised) do not have DAP, 
either through choice or lack of resources/outreach. Second, the people who face the most 
extreme barriers to escaping poverty are usually unregistered, illiterate and have no land.  
A group of rural workers in União, Piauí, told us that the fight against hunger and poverty is 
impossible unless first dealing with the issue of land.  
Brazil’s National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) has implemented 
a programme that incentivises (with a R$3000/US$1476 grant) the addition of the female head 
of household in the land title of agrarian reform settlers. Currently, DAP has no such incentive, 
which means that the male head of household is almost always the head of household for the 
family farm and is responsible for receiving the PAA payments. The only exception is the 
Mulher Agregada or Jovem accessory which has been an addition to the principal DAP and 
allows for the female head of household or a son, respectively, to be added but doesn’t 
necessarily introduce incentives to include them in an existing DAP registry with the male as 
the head of household (MDA, 2008). Brazil’s other targeting mechanism for social programmes, 
Working Paper 13 
 
the single registry (Cadastro Único), uses the female head of household to incorporate families 
in the popular Bolsa Família programme (among others), as the females receive the transfer. 
The issue of cross-referencing the registries is under discussion, but no concrete proposals 
have been presented to date, partly due to the obstacle of different heads of household  
in each registry.  
Expansion of the programme can be analysed in terms of different pathways  
(Linn/IFPRI, 2012). Expanding the programme geographically or to a particular population 
could follow a ‘horizontal’ duplication across new areas. Adding or modifying modalities could 
represent a ‘functional’ expansion through new methods to increase participation. Institutional 
expansion across local, state or national levels indicates a ‘vertical’ expansion. Due to the  
multi-stakeholder design of the programme, it is expanding in all three of these ways. Local 
administrators are receiving additional funds to expand their procurement to new family 
farmers, which expands registration of DAP and more bank accounts. Vertically, the programme’s 
budgetary expansion is to be allocated to the three primary CDS sub-modalities (Estuadual, 
Municipal, Conab) and will expand the role of each modality through the corresponding 
stakeholder. As of July 2012 the PAA has introduced a new model for payments to be made 
through CDS PAA-Municipal and Estadual. These two modalities have been associated with  
a cumbersome and often delayed payment mechanism (Chmielewska and Souza, 2010).  
The new model uses a debit card (see Figure 5) that can withdraw money at any ATM and  
does not require an account or participation in a cooperative/association. The card should 
significantly improve the availability of the PAA to more vulnerable populations. We found 
some farmers were unable to access a bank account due to being illiterate, not having proper 
documentation or having to pass some type of credit check. 
FIGURE 5 
PAA Debit Card  
 
4.1  CHALLENGES AND ACHIEVEMENTS AROUND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PAA  
When confronting the question of expanding the PAA in both terms of adding producers and 
expanding the productive capacity of existing participants, we encountered similar results: lack 
of knowledge about the programme, lack of institutional participation and weak institutional 
capacity. The lack of knowledge was apparent in several municipalities but strongest in União, 
Piauí, and Itapipoca, Ceará. In União, many older farmers were unconvinced and unaware of 
the potential benefits of participating in the PAA and had no interest in becoming involved 
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despite the insistence of other neighbouring farmers. For farmers in Itapipoca we observed a 
slightly different perspective; the initial participating farmers experienced significant delays in 
receiving payments, the PAA developed a poor reputation, and as a result most farmers had 
little to no interest in becoming involved.  
Due to the numerous stakeholders involved in the planning, implementation and 
monitoring of the PAA, it requires a minimum level of organisation and commitment to be 
successful. For many municipalities this is a barrier to attempting to scale up the programme. 
In the state of Piauí the contrast in local institutional capacities was astounding. For example, 
the municipality of Alto Longá had very willing rural workers’ unions, but the lack of 
commitment from the local government was a clear obstacle to securing and demanding more 
resources to implement modalities of the PAA. However, in São João de Arraial the municipal 
government was not only committed to engaging with the PAA directly but also to facilitating 
and encouraging associations and cooperatives to organise and access the programme 
through CDS PAA-Conab. In the latter case, our inquiries revealed that the productive and 
organisational participation of the farmers is ready and willing to increase both the  
amount of products and the number of participating farmers.  
In many cases the organisations involved in the PAA had popular participation and 
motivated producers but lacked the institutional capacity to expand their beneficiaries.  
In Esperantina, Piauí, we worked with a passionate and driven association—the Centre for 
Popular Education Esperantina (CEPES)—that coordinated a project through CDS PAA-Conab. 
Due to their limited capacity (staff, time and financial resources), CEPES was not able to expand 
its project to include more producers or recipient institutions. Additionally, it did not have any 
formal arrangement with the Prefeitura to coordinate its efforts between the two PAA 
modalities. As a result, its PAA-Conab project was completely sovereign and coordinated  
solely within the association. Its responsibility even extended to using the personal cars of the 
association’s employees to deliver the farmers’ products. They were very grateful for our visit, 
since it doubled the carrying capacity with another car. Without the personal commitment of 
the association’s employees, the issue of transportation becomes a significant problem. In one 
agrarian reform settlement we asked what the farmers do if the association employees do not 
come with their cars. In this settlement the farmer said that only one person in the area had a 
motorbike, and he will try to load it up with all their products, but there is often too much,  
and it either takes several trips or he can only deliver a portion of the goods. 
The PAA also promotes income generation from sustainable gathering of naturally 
produced goods. For example, a local cooperative in Esperantina, Piauí, is organised around 
harvesting and producing babassu (Attalea speciosa), a naturally occurring species of palm tree 
that produces a seed that can be used to produce several goods. The babassu breakers 
(quebradeiras de coco) are an association of all females that work together to break open the 
shells and then process the various parts (i.e. inner shell for flour, seeds for oil and outer shell for 
charcoal). The demand for their products has seen rapid expansion, partly due to participation 
in the PAA. During our visit they had recently financed and constructed a new processing 
building to make flour from the inner shell of the seed. They use the babassu flour to either 
bake goods for market or to sell raw for about US$10 per kilogramme. Babassu also gives them 
an inner seed or nut that is processed to make oil which can be used to make an almost 
innumerable amount of products. Lastly, they are able to use the outer shell of the seed as 
charcoal to use in their ovens. The shell burns very hot, lasts a long time and is in abundance  
as a by-product from processing the seed. 
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Another interesting use of the PAA was witnessed in an agrarian reform settlement near 
Esperantina. The canto settlement has been in existence for less than a year and thus has little 
infrastructure and limited production. Nevertheless, they were able to be incorporated into a 
PAA project coordinated through a local association and committed to delivering products 
from the surrounding forest. The settlers collect oranges and bananas and make babaçu oil  
to sell through the PAA which then ends up in the hands and mouths of children at a local 
Catholic school for vulnerable children. The farmland on the settlement is used only for 
subsistence production, while the PAA provides them with an option to gain extra income 
(around US$50–60 a month). Moreover, the production of babaçu oil provides the women in 
the settlement with a value-added product, since they need to break the babaçu seeds and 
make the oil. These two examples display not only the flexibility and importance of the  
PAA in supporting rural livelihoods but also its ability to support production not guaranteed 
through a traditional market. Without the PAA, many of the wonderful natural products  
(such as babaçu) or underutilised produce (such as bananas or oranges) would go to waste.  
We heard many stories of fruit that was in oversupply during ripening and could be channelled 
through the PAA instead of spoiling. In Alto Longá a farmer even invested in fruit pulp 
processing equipment that allowed him to use previously wasted fruit crops to make  
pulp that could be sold through the PAA.  
We observed the programme’s effect not only on increasing production but also on 
organising production. Prior to involvement in the PAA, many producers only had one market, 
the intermediary, which typically only purchases a minimal amount of products. Since the price 
was also significantly lower, the producers would allocate a larger portion of land to a single 
market crop. The PAA allows farmers to sell a wider variety of produce, which results in less 
volatile income, increased food security through subsistence and more integrated  
productive methods through crop rotation and intercropping.  
Measures of sustainability are also inherent in the design of the programme. With an 
emphasis on bringing back the local aspect of the food system—local production for local 
consumption—the programme is fostering the development of locally focused food security. 
As family farmers become more integrated and develop stronger relations with local markets,  
a much more sustainable and localised food system will emerge. This type of food system 
separates itself from private monopolies controlling the intermediary channels from producer 
to consumer. By surpassing such private intermediaries, the PAA is able to offer much higher 
and less volatile prices based on a regional market average and not one controlled  
by private monopolies.  
Moreover, in 2011, Law no. 12,512 established that agro-ecological or organic products 
may be procured at a price of up to 30 per cent more than the prices set for conventional 
products by Conab. This incentive encourages farmers to reduce their dependence on 
external, chemical-based inputs and genetically modified organisms (GMOs), while potentially 
enhancing soil and food quality and resource efficiency. Agro-ecology-based production 
focuses on integrated and diverse agro-ecosystems which rely on local, native species and 
inputs instead of external, patented and chemical-based inputs. It, therefore, fosters a 
movement towards food sovereignty by encouraging the use of local seeds through seed 
banks, culturally and locally sensitive food production and natural processes to produce 
without dependence on external inputs. 
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5  KEY COMPONENTS TO CONSIDER FOR SUCCESSFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION AND SCALING UP 
Observed outcomes of the PAA were generally positive, and the participating farmers 
expressed their belief in the programme’s ability to overcome many of their biggest obstacles. 
But can this experience be easily duplicated in other regions, countries and continents?  
For many marginalised farmers around the globe obstacles can range from market access to 
climate disasters or dispossession. Therefore, it is essential to understand the building blocks  
of the PAA and its potential duplication based on potentially very different circumstances.  
With this in mind, the following section will identify the necessary stakeholders, various  
levels of participation and the possible impact a programme such as the PAA can have.  
It also includes a chronological depiction of a conceptual implementation of a PAA-style  
public procurement programme.  
Connecting smallholder production with fulfilling the nutritional needs of poor people  
is a wonderful idea and a fantastic use of public funds. In practice, the idea can be a bit more 
difficult to implement when considering a few important questions: 
1. Targeting and coverage: How can a public procurement programme ensure that it is 
also reaching vulnerable producers who can disproportionately benefit from the provision of  
a social market mechanism? Existing targeting and registration mechanisms may be able to 
undergo some changes to ensure they include more relevant indicators such as land type and 
use, labour dependency and composition, availability and level of infrastructure and access to 
markets and productive recourses such as water for irrigation. Additionally, head of household 
data need to be carefully analysed to provide a better picture of household composition and 
consider other options to organise payment delivery. The new ATM card is one such 
innovation that introduces a more flexible option for faster and less strict payments.  
2. Timely payment delivery: There are a number of factors that affect timely payments—
ranging from budget allocations and timely transfer funds to the local level to the design of 
payment systems themselves. What should be the distribution channels to reach those who 
may not currently be within the ambit of the formal financial system? Should the procurement 
system work through electronic bank transfers only or should the local administrator purchase 
the products with cash? On the one hand, electronic transfers can ensure a more timely and 
efficient payment, but this may be challenging where the family farmers are relatively isolated 
and face logistical and other barriers to interacting with the formal banking and credit systems. 
On the other hand, requiring a bank account can facilitate access to additional credit and 
provide a surer way to save money. Issues of payment should thus be designed on a case-by-
case basis, and programme managers can also draw on delivery mechanisms such as mobile 
phone transfers, mobile banking or the use of banking correspondent agents. Lastly, fiscal 
space on the federal level is crucial, as local funding may not be up to the task in the sense  
of not being responsive to the scale of the challenge and regional disparities.7  
3. Organisation of farmer capacities: The process of organising farmer capacities—
whether in the form of an association, cooperative or informal group—is a fundamental 
component of a procurement process targeted at smallholders. For participants to learn  
about the programme offerings, to prepare proposals, organise production, identify, plan  
and facilitate food drop-offs, access payments, arrange for and cost transportation requires a 
significant level of organisational capacity and putting in place delivery mechanisms. 
Cooperatives and associations may not be as well developed among poor and often  
dispersed family farmers. On many occasions during our field visits in the north-east of Brazil 
Working Paper 17 
 
we found that it was local NGOs and associations that were filling this niche, facilitating the 
organisational process for the family farmers and coordinating the relationship between family 
farmers and the executor of the PAA. For programme expansion, however, we cannot assume 
that all communities will have NGOs and associations willing to take over the facilitation 
process on a voluntary basis. Thus, it is necessary that the design of public food procurement 
programmes consider the on-the-ground conditions for such programmes and the potential  
to formally incorporate or to collaborate with civil-society-led initiatives that can help with 
outreach, capacity-building and technical support. Consider, for example, the Canasta 
Comunitaria in Ecuador that is the result of civil society organisation and activism and exists 
outside the formal government structures.8  
4. Transportation: Who can and should take on the responsibility of transporting the 
produce, especially in communities where both the producers (distant from main roads or 
where local transportation is limited or costly) and the consumers are challenged in this 
regard? Should there be some provision for costing transportation in such communities? 
 Food banks, community kitchens, schools9 and any other food benefactor will most likely be 
based in more urban areas, but small farmers may not have access to transportation that can 
deliver their produce to them. A farmer cooperative, association or neighbourhood 
collaboration could be an option, but that may not always be up to the task of meeting the 
demand for all the products that need to be delivered. The PAA does not explicitly provide 
resources for transportation, although in many cases the municipality or the association 
facilitates transportation at its own cost. The advantage of family farmers forming informal 
groups or cooperatives or getting involved in an association is the ability to pool resources to 
provide a collective means of transportation. However, the fact that thePAA fails to consider or 
to make formal provision for such an important part of the procurement process should not be 
overlooked. Many new land reform settlements are located in excluded areas with poor road 
access and very few means of transportation. Thus, for a public procurement programme to 
function much more effectively, the question of transportation must be addressed to provide 
family farmers with access to their secured market.  
 
With these obstacles in mind we can look at the response of Brazil’s policymakers to  
get a picture of the role and responsibility of the stakeholders to overcome these challenges: 
1. Targeting and coverage: Farmers who wish to participate in these food procurement 
programmes must be considered ‘family farmers’ according to the declaration of aptitude for 
PRONAF (DAP), Brazil’s family farm registry. According to the latest Census of Agriculture 
(2006), 4,367,902 establishments, representing 84.4 per cent of total agricultural 
establishments, were identified as ‘family farmers’. However, many of the very poorest and 
often landless farmers have yet to be registered with DAP and are thus excluded from public 
programmes targeting family farmers. Based on the latest data from Brazil’s Secretary of  
Family Agriculture of the Ministry of Agrarian Development, roughly 204,000 family farmers 
participated in the PAA in 2011, representing just 4.67 per cent of the total number of family 
farmers eligible for the PAA through DAP (MDA, 2012).  
However, there are two important elements to consider regarding these data: (i) not all 
family farmers registered with DAP need/want to participate in the PAA, as they may already 
have access to markets on favourable terms; and (ii) there are undoubtedly family farmers  
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not registered with DAP due to a lack of access, awareness or choice. In any case, the data 
available present a large discrepancy between the number of family farmers eligible to 
participate and coverage.  
Since the PAA aims to strengthen family farming by providing guaranteed market access 
to excluded or exploited family farmers, the programme is not necessarily targeting all farmers 
registered with DAP. Thus, the aforementioned figure of 4.67 per cent is not representative  
of a targeted-coverage ratio, but rather an eligible-coverage ratio. The PAA’s current budget  
of R$775 million (US$381 million) represents a mere 0.0000187 per cent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Thus, if the PAA were to cover all family farmers registered with DAP—not 
necessarily targeted, but eligible—it would have to increase funding by approximately 25 
times from what it is now. A 25-fold increase would amount to 0.0004675 per cent of GDP 
(2011) or roughly R$19.3 billion (US$9.65 billion). This means that, based on the available data, 
the PAA presently procures an average of about R$3800 (US$1870) of food per family farmer 
per year, and the budgetary expansion of R$19.3 billion would assume that same average. 
However, these are purely mathematical calculations, and we also need to take into account 
the institutional capacity of the government on all levels as well as the organisational 
procedures needed. In any case, efforts at scaling up should be a priority due to the  
prevalence of rural poverty, the large livelihood dependence on smallholder agriculture,  
and the relatively minute funding designated to the PAA, covering less than 5 per cent  
of eligible family farmers in Brazil.  
Further, DAP registration should take on a much more proactive approach to target those 
eligible, as is proposed by the new focus on active search (busca activa)10 in the context of BSM. 
A nationwide DAP campaign to target eligible beneficiaries coupled with information sessions 
on public programmes and eligibility would undoubtedly attract a larger percentage of poor 
people in rural areas, providing them with access to key extension services such as credit and 
technical assistance, as well as a guaranteed fair-priced market. Scaling up the PAA and 
specifically targeting poor people in rural areas will foster the transition to a sustainable 
pathway out of poverty, which for Brazil and for most countries remains largely a rural 
problem. Additionally, as described above, most social programmes are accessed through 
Brazil’s single registry—the Cadastro Único—which uses the female head of household as  
the payment recipient of cash transfers and other social welfare programmes. Since DAP is 
typically registered with the male head of household as responsible for receiving payments, 
the two registries may depict different experiences. That said, there are numerous variables to 
consider, and classifying rural wage labourers as family farmers under Cadastro Único could be 
a more efficient option than attempting to apply family farm indicators as currently used by DAP.  
2. Payment delivery: The PAA uses a multi-stakeholder process that channels federal 
resources to farmers through various modalities as described above. This design gives various 
forms of local administrators access to the programme. For example, an active farmer cooperative 
can articulate its PAA project with the state Conab office if the municipal government is 
inactive. Conversely, a municipal government can proactively articulate a PAA project with 
either the state government or the federal government. Verification of produce delivery has 
been a problem resulting in payment delays, although the increased use of electronic 
verification through PAAnet is minimising this issue (Chmielewska and Souza, 2010).  
An optimal system would have full access to electronic verification, and all family farmers 
would have an approved bank account eligible to receive bank transfers. This appears  
to be the goal of Brazil’s PAA, but it is a long process to integrate everyone, especially  
the most marginalised.  
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3. Organisation: Local facilitation of the programme also takes many forms due to the 
different modalities. This facet of the programme is particularly important, as it identifies and 
uses governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders. Conab is also a crucial organisation 
that can work directly with cooperatives and associations outside state and local government 
structures. Municipal governments can still play the role of the primary organiser by offering 
the PAA to individual farmers that have DAP and are not associated with a cooperative or 
association. Therefore, Brazil’s design in offering numerous modalities is paramount  
to its early success and its ability to be scaled up.  
4. Transportation: The most difficult obstacle we identified was transportation. 
Marginalised areas are typically far from urban or even semi-urban areas and have little to no 
access to public transport. We visited many recent land reform settlements where few settlers 
had a car or even a motorcycle. In most cases where the municipal government (the Secretary 
of Rural Development) was implementing a modality of the PAA (CDS PAA-Municipal or 
Estadual) it was integrating transportation and the distribution of the products with the 
municipal Secretary of Social Assistance. That relationship proved to be extremely important 
for the farmers to have assured delivery of the products, as well as efficient distribution of  
the food to properly identified populations. However, in modalities where the municipal 
government is bypassed (CDS PAA-Conab, when a cooperative runs a project with the state 
Conab office) there is little capacity for integrated transportation. We witnessed many ways in 
which the cooperative would organise communal transportation, but the size and weight of 
the delivery would cause problems. Unfortunately, we were unable to advance any solutions 
with regard to transportation, and this issue continues to plague the programme in some 
areas. Ideas such as budgetary provisioning for contracting private transport or using public 
transport come to mind, but there could still be barriers to integrate all participating family 
farmers, let alone addressing the anticipated expansion of the programme. 
5.1  EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES AND FUTURE TRAJECTORIES 
The PAA represents a new agricultural policy model for boosting incomes of smallholders 
while supporting the food-insecure population. Its design creates a new market for the 
commercialisation of family farm products with the aim of expanding additional market 
opportunities and improving linkages and new supply chains beyond the programme’s 
designed parameters. Our interviews revealed a mixed message with key policymakers and 
those on the ground overseeing the implementation of the programme. When looking at the 
programme in the future, how will family farmers use it, and will the terms change as their 
participation and production evolve?  
Discussions with key policymakers indicated that the PAA’s long-term role for  
family farmers is to augment their income and provide a pathway to other markets.  
The MDA’s National Secretary for Family Farming, Laudemir Müller, described the PAA as a 
commercialisation vehicle that paves the way for linkages to new private market opportunities. 
We did witness this potential several times when farmers explained that the PAA price  
allowed them to have a much better price reference with regard to selling in local markets or 
bargaining with intermediaries that once held a monopolistic power. The revitalisation  
of local products, such as babaçu oil, also increases consumer awareness and can  
stimulate a larger private market.  
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However, our field experience indicated that the PAA does not have the potential, by 
itself, to ‘graduate’ family farmers. But should ‘graduation’ be an objective of the programme? 
A yearly cap of R$8000 (US$3938) is minimal to the state but can be a significant income and 
investment boost for capitally constrained farmers. Moreover, family farmers only receive a 
total of 25 per cent of available agricultural credit in Brazil, yet they account for 40 per cent  
of the total national value of production and generate 77 per cent of Brazil’s agricultural 
employment (Boyce et al., 2005). Agricultural finance is much more widely available to large 
agribusiness operating large-scale mono-crop plantations on over 1000 hectares (IBGE, 2006).  
On the demand side, the PAA actively contributes to the fight against hunger. To date  
it has procured over 3 million tonnes of food that goes to benefit some 20 million Brazilians 
annually (MDA, 2012). Brazil’s level of food insecurity has been declining rapidly, and in the  
last 10 years the level of malnourishment has gone from 9 per cent to just under 6 per cent 
(FAO, 2012). Those numbers still leave room for significant improvement and for an expanded 
role of the PAA to fulfil the nutritional needs of millions of Brazilians, but it raises the question 
about potential limits emerging on the demand side. This is particularly the case at the local 
level, where there could be mismatches between supply and demand. One idea would be to 
integrate food policies to ensure adequate control of demand- and supply-side pressures.  
In the Brazilian context, the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE) has an annual budget  
of over R$3 billion and feeds around 50 million pupils daily (FNDE, 2012). In 2009, the PNAE 
was significantly altered under Law no. 11,947 which established a legal obligation that  
30 per cent of the school feeding budget must go to procurement from family farms (Ibid).  
The legal directive of 30 per cent is a benchmark that many municipalities are struggling 
to reach while others are surpassing. Our visit to the municipality of São João de Arraial in  
Piauí demonstrated the capability of a municipality to source 70–100 per cent of its school 
feeding programme from local family farmers. A lot of its success could be attributed to the 
municipality’s coordination and integration of local family farming communities. Integrating 
programmes and local institutions can provide better oversight and identification of how a 
higher volume of local produce can fit demand. In this sense, the PAA could serve  
as a platform to commercialise family farm production for local needs and even beyond.  
Local farmers’ markets can be used to link the producers directly with the consumer with 
benefits for both parties in the transaction. Such local models that bring the producer and 
consumer closer together result in lower transportation costs and emissions, knowledge about 
the source and production of the food and lower costs for the consumer, and a higher return 
for the producer. Still, many producers go to supermarkets, since they are more convenient 
and carry a wider selection and range of products.  
To strengthen rural livelihoods, it is crucial to obtain access and control over land and its 
productive resources. However, it is the (lack of) access to markets which can hinder their 
pathway out of poverty, and private markets do not always ensure fair and competitive 
markets for farmers outside national economies of scale. Their exclusion in terms of road 
access, infrastructure, irrigation systems, credit, public programmes and markets hinders  
their ability to improve their quality of life and overcome poverty and hunger. With a public 
intermediary assuming a much larger role, the government could fill this gap by providing 
access to markets targeted at family famers in competition with private intermediaries that 
often purchase from the same family farmers at (unfair) low prices and sell the produce to 
consumers (or distributors) that can inflate prices from the original purchase value.  
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Due to a variety of factors, including a lack of options, lack of knowledge of base prices, 
unequal terms of negotiations, lack of transportation etc., excluded family farmers often 
receive a very low price for their crops, which can still translate into much higher  
prices to consumers. 
However, if the PAA were to increase its capacity and its role as a public intermediary—
one that buys and sells—it could advance its mandate through increased purchases and 
position itself as a wholesaler of family farm production. Since the majority of products 
procured by the PAA are donated to vulnerable populations, increasing its role as a seller  
of crops at fair prices to local consumers would enable the programme to cover more  
family farmers while simultaneously offering producers fair prices.  
This functional expansion could increase coverage and participation among both 
producers and consumers while simultaneously increasing the programme’s budget and 
financial sustainability. Based on 2012 data thus far, the Stock Formation (FE) and Direct 
Purchase (CD) PAA modalities represent just 2 per cent of the programme’s budget. These 
modalities consist of both procuring crops from family farmers and selling/marketing crops to 
consumers. Therefore, increasing the PAA’s coverage in terms of scaling up and expanding its 
functional capacity through these two modalities could increase family farm participation as 
well as guaranteeing consumers fair and non-volatile prices.  
In practice, this functional expansion could continue to procure crops from eligible family 
farmers but also increase its marketing function by bringing these procured crops to local 
markets and selling them at fair and non-volatile prices. This revenue would, therefore,  
allow the programme to continue to expand both functionally and horizontally with  
increased institutional capacity, logistics and personnel. 
To be clear, we are not suggesting that the PAA change its role as a supplier of food 
donations for the most vulnerable people. Rather, it could increase its role as a seller of fair-
priced crops to consumers who may spend the major portion of their income on food and are 
deeply affected by any sort of price volatility in the marketplace.11 By doing so, the PAA could 
potentially have the resources to scale up its efforts to benefit more producers and consumers 
alike—offering a stable and fair and more competitive pricing system. This not only gives 
farmers a base-price reference for which they should sell their goods but will also inevitably 
bring down prices for consumers with more competition in the market. As a buyer and seller—
virtually filling the gap between producer and consumer—an expanded role of the PAA  
could offer guaranteed market access at fair prices for family farmers and also ensure adequate 
supply and fair prices for consumers. This would ultimately eliminate private monopolisation 
of the domestic food system and mitigate volatile food prices for both producers and 
consumers. It would also eliminate the ability of private intermediaries to hoard massive  
stocks of food when market prices are unfavourable and control purchase prices. Moreover, 
the increased control over the food system by the Brazilian people through a state 
intermediary would be an advance towards food sovereignty for the country. 
5.2  CONCLUSIONS  
Brazil’s PAA is an innovative policy that requires a minimal amount of budget allocation  
while combating food insecurity and supporting rural livelihoods. Its multi-stakeholder design 
broadens participation and fosters farmer organisation. At the same time, the programme still 
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faces challenges to incorporate the most vulnerable producers and address some operational 
difficulties such as transportation, payment mechanisms and rapid scaling up. However, our 
research identified that the programme’s design can have varying results depending on the 
involvement of local institutions and coordination.  
As a sustainable local development initiative, the PAA relies significantly on well-coordinated 
multi-stakeholder relationships and particularly engaged and committed local facilitators.  
The programme’s various modalities and executors provide institutional space for a number  
of facilitators to mobilise and actively seek out participation in the PAA. We recognise the 
irreplaceable role of Conab in its modality that allows it to directly engage with farmer 
cooperatives and associations. However, the true measure of the programme’s success can be 
seen in the number of participating stakeholders and their level of participation. A real recipe 
for positive outcomes involves a multi-level, coordinated effort to ensure popular participation, 
share information and confront the challenges described above.  
It is evident that the PAA offers a twin-track response to hunger and rural poverty by 
providing access to food to those most in need, while simultaneously revitalising family farm 
agriculture by providing guaranteed market access. This undoubtedly has, and will continue 
to, alleviate rural poverty and hunger in Brazil. The government should also consider balancing 
its budget allocation to reflect not only where the domestic food supply comes from (family 
farmers) but also the group which represents the large majority of agricultural establishments 
(family farmers). Instead, during the 2009–2010 agricultural year, the family farming sector was 
allocated just US$9.6 billion, while agribusiness received US$59.3 billion—over six times more. 
To include the poorest and most vulnerable populations (BSM’s goal), the government 
needs to strengthen its land reform and related public policies to reach land reform 
settlements. The landless and recent land reform settlers are the hardest to identify, often  
due to their lack of formal land rights, individual or collective documentation and lack of 
infrastructure (communications, access to government services etc.). But this population also 
has the greatest production potential due to their untapped labour supply, limited public 
investment and crop diversity (Altieri et al., 2012). By addressing some of the key flaws of  
the PAA as discussed in Section 5, this vulnerable population can fully realise the potential  
of the programme and undergo a productive transformation that provides more income, 
food and market security.  
Supporting and identifying farmer organisations expands one of the most important 
institutional platforms to implement the programme. An improvement in the payment 
mechanism to ensure prompt and widespread availability of payments should be highlighted 
as an area for improvement. The new payment model using a debit card is a big move in the 
right direction and was only launched as this paper was being written. This model allows  
for a direct transfer of funds from the federal government to the farmer and removes the 
responsibility of the local facilitator to organise payments. Furthermore, the card does not 
require a previous bank account, which will expand the PAA to farmers who do not have 
access to formal finance.  
These challenges are highlighted not only to identify areas of improvement in the  
PAA but also as important considerations to transfer the programme’s experience to other 
countries. The PAA is a wonderful example of offering market access and fair prices, either 
directly or indirectly, to farmers. Most of the vulnerable producers around the world receive 
little to no support from government and face barriers to accessing markets under favourable 
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terms. A public procurement programme aimed specifically at smallholders can provide  
them with fair prices and ensure competition for intermediaries, serve as a crucial safety  
net in the fight against hunger and promote farmer organisation.  
Brazil’s experience demonstrates a feasible budgetary option for any government to 
boost local economies and provide a decentralised and sustainable policy for food security. 
The integration of local production and consumption provides more transparency in the food 
system and increases the demand for traditional food varieties that are often produced more 
sustainably with fewer chemical inputs and a lower carbon footprint.  
Currently, the PAA is undergoing ‘vertical’, ‘horizontal’ and ‘functional’ expansion, but 
many barriers still exist. A nationwide marketing campaign could help producers become 
aware of what the PAA is and how they can get involved and benefit. Local governments 
should receive more information about the PAA and an incentive to proactively implement the 
policy. Additionally, Conab’s funding and structure should be increased not only to expand  
the PAA but also to augment its ability to commercialise family farmers’ products and  
perhaps serve as a larger public intermediary, as was discussed above.  
Public procurement schemes are becoming more popular and important to provide  
a more level playing field for smallholder farms, but there is still a lot of work to be done. 
Industrial agriculture still receives a majority of government assistance, whether technical or 
financial. Many countries have a public food procurement scheme but fail to effectively target 
smallholders as the productive force. The diversity of small producers in the programme in 
Brazil reflects the ability of the PAA to reach them and realise their productive potential.  
In various instances the programme has provided an outlet for produce that was often  
otherwise wasted or did not have a clear market opportunity—for example, fruit pulp.  
Many more linkages have yet to be made between school feeding programmes  
and family farm production. This is an area for potential growth that could further boost 
smallholder incomes and improve food quality. Hopefully the lesson of Brazil’s PAA can be a 
starting point for a continual improvement within the country and new innovations abroad. 
Many lessons can be learned from the Brazilian case, but it is certainly not a ‘silver bullet’ 
solution. An expansion of targeted food procurement programmes could provide 
advancements in design and new targeting methods. Furthermore, the programme  
has numerous benefits, but a more in-depth and larger impact and evaluation study  
could provide more insight into more of its outcomes, gaps and potentials.  
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 NOTES 
 
1. For a formal definition of family farms in Brazil, see Law no. 11,326 ‘Family Farming Law’ in Section 2.1. 
2. The size of a fiscal module is defined on a municipal basis and varies around the country – the average size is typically 
larger in the southern and western regions of the country and smallest in the north-east. In many of the larger areas, such 
as Pirapora, Minas Gerais, the average size of 280 ha is much higher than the state’s rough average of 70 ha due to the 
forest code (codigo florestal) which requires producers to set aside forested land for environmental protection. In the 
state of Parana, 470,000  rural properties are registered as family farms out of the total of 514,000 and vary in size from 20 
ha to 120 ha, since only 8 per cent have to set aside land in compliance with the forest code. See 
<http://agricultura.ruralbr.com.br/noticia/2011/06/tamanho-do-modulo-fiscal-citado-no-codigo-florestal-varia-em-cada-
municipio-brasileiro-3333440.html.>. 
3. So-called ‘land reform settlements’ are a critical component of Brazil’s agrarian reforms. Del Grossi (2011) estimates 
that between 2003 and 2009, 574,532 families were settled on land amounting to 47.7 million hectares. The process 
involved 3386 projects that accounted for approximately 62 per cent of all the settlements established over the past  
39 years. A specific institution, the National Institute for Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de 
Colonização e Reforma Agrária – INCRA), was created in 1970 to implement agrarian reform involving expropriation 
compensation and titling-related processes.   
4. For a complete list of DAP groups and eligibility, see: <http://www.agricultura.al.gov.br/programas/DAP.pdf>.  
5. PAAnet:<http://www.conab.gov.br/produtosServicos-PAANET-interna.php?a=503?a=1129&t=2>. 
6. Productive inclusion (inclusão produtiva) is a cross-cutting thread that runs across Brazilian social policy and  
incorporates a focus on capacity-building activities to enhance access to formal employment and/or improve the quality 
of productive work and activity that poor people enter into through self-employment, individual or collective self-
employment (associative or cooperative) and family farming etc. In fact, family farmers have been subject to considerable 
attention in the context of cross-ministerial programmes aimed at enhancing productive inclusion.  
See Lal and Junior (2011). 
7. Such as Brazil’s north-east – federal funds for the PAA are an instrument to funnel federal funding from the more 
developed south and south-east to the poorer and more unequal north-east. 
8. The Canasta Comunitaria was initially organised in 1987 and now incorporates some 1400 families at both ends of 
production and consumption. The idea derived from consumers wanting affordable, healthy and local varieties of food 
that were disappearing in local grocery stores. It serves as a platform to establish agreements between local small 
farmers and consumers willing to purchase their produce. See Gortaire (2006). 
9. Benefactor institutions vary and are determined by the ‘project’ run by the cooperative, municipality or Conab.  
They are typically part of a social protection system, either governmental or private, and receive the procured  
food to offset their existing budget. 
10. The busca ativa refers to the ‘active search’ of the Brazilian federal government to actively locate and provide 
documentation and services to the identified 16 million Brazilians living in extreme poverty. As a part of the BSM 
programme, the buscar ativa intends to build a bridge between the state and its citizen to include all Brazilian  
citizens in the formal social services network and ensure that they are no longer ‘invisible’. 
11. According to IFAD’s Rural Poverty Report 2011, ‘poor’ people spend 50–80 per cent of their income  
on food (IFAD, 2010). 
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